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I.
PARTIES TO T H E A P P E A L
The

parties

to this

appeal

are t h e A p p e l l a n t ,

Pamel

Chaffin (hereinafter Chaff in) , and t h e A p p e l l e e , A l b e r t s o n s , „n.-,
(hereinafter Albertsons) .
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IV.
JURISDICTION
Original jurisdiction in this matter was vested in the Utah
Supreme Court pursuant to 78-2-2
Jurisdiction

(3)(j) Utah Code Ann. 1953.

is now properly vested in the Court of Appeals

pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated

1953

(as

amended), Sec. 78-2-4 (4) and Sec. 78-2a-3 (2) (k).
V.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court committed
reversible

error

by

granting

Albertsons

Motion

for

Summary

Judgement and dismissing the appellant's Complaint with prejudicee
Summary Judgement is appropriate when there are no genuine
issues of material fact and the moving party
judgement as a matter of law.
courts determination

is entitled to

No deference is given to the trial

of whether there are material

facts in

dispute, but a review of the facts and inferences drawn therefrom
are viewed in a light most favorable to the losing party.

Any

doubts or uncertainties concerning issues of fact are resolved in
favor of the losing party and any legal conclusions are reviewed
for correctness with no deference given to the trial court.
Canfield v. Albertsons, 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah App. 1992).

Citations

omitted.
VI.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Rule 56 (c) of the U.R.Civ.P.is
authority on appeal.
1

the sole

determinative

Rule 56(c), U.R.Civ.P., provides in pertinent parts;
"The judgement sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgement as a matter
of law."
VII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

Chaffin brought this action to recover damages for injuries
she sustained when she slipped and fell in water left by a floor
cleaning machine owned by Albertsons in an Albertsons supermarket
on January 3, 1991 at or about 7:00 a.m.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

Plaintiff filed her Complaint on December 11, 1991 which
defendant answered on December 30, 1991. After interrogatories of
both parties and the depositions taken of plaintiff and Allen
Morley,

an Albertsons1

agent/employee,

a Motion

Judgement was filed by Albertsons on May 5, 1993.

For

Summary

Oral argument

was heard on June 23, 1993 and at that time Motion For Summary
Judgement was denied.

Defendants renewed their motion on October

8, 1993 and this was argued on November 5, 1993 and Summary
Judgement was granted.

The order was signed by Judge Richard H.

Moffat of the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah and
entered on November 15, 1993.

2

VIII.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
These facts are largely stated in a light most favorable to
appellant which is how they must be reviewed by an appellate court
in reviewing an appeal by the losing party from a Motion For
Summary Judgement.
1.

That on January 3, 1991, plaintiff drove her automobile

and parked near the front entrance of the Albertsons Taylorsville
store located at 1825 West 4700 South sometime between the hours
of 6:15 a.m. to 7:00 a.m.
2.

(Record at 102 and 374).

She entered the market in low heeled pumps and proceeded

to the bakery near the front of the store.

She picked up one bran

muffin from the bakery and proceeded down another aisle and picked
up a bottle of soda pop and walked to the back of the store and
turned left and was walking back to the dairy department.

(Record

at 378 line 23 - 380 line 12, 391 and 455).
3.

She looked up and saw a floor cleaning machine coming out

of one aisle.
4.
aisle.
5.

She saw this machine make a turn and proceed down another
(Record at 381) .
She took a couple of steps and her feet went out from

under her.
6.

(Record at 380-81).

(Record at 381) .

She sat there stunned and dazed for a few minutes and when

she got up she noticed some sudsy water

(Record at 383) and a

puddle of water approximately one foot in diameter.
388-90).
3

(Record at

7. The floor cleaning machine that left the spot of water was
purchased and owned by Albertsons.

(Record at 343-44).

8. That the times and hours of the cleaning of the floors by
the operator of the machine were dictated by Albertsons.

(Record

at 316-17, 342-43).
9.

That the day was clear and cold with the snow having

fallen a couple of days before the accident.

(Record at 373-374).

IX.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

Issues of material fact that arise from reasonable

inferences to be submitted to a jury are present in this case and
this case should be remanded to the lower court for a trial.
2.

Chaffin does not have to show that Albertsons had notice

of the wet spot on the floor in which she slipped and fell if the
following exceptions to the notice requirement are present in this
case:
ac That Albertsons purchased, owned, and controlled the
floor cleaning machine that left the spot of water.
b.
That Albertsons dictated the time that the floor
cleaning machine was used with the fact that there was
a conflict with the floor cleaning machine and stocking
of shelves by Albertson's employee on the morning in the
Albertsons store.
3.

The following facts;
a. That the floor cleaning machine had passed over
the area immediately before plaintiff slipped and
fell.
bo That the water in which plaintiff slipped was
sudsy.
c. That the spot on the floor was similar to a spot
of water one would see after mopping a floor;

4.

Give rise to the reasonable inferences that;
a. Sudsy water in the back of a food store is not
a hazard that is normally encountered in a store
unless placed there by such an article as a floor
cleaning machine.
b.
That sudsy soapy water normally would not be
tracked in by a user of a market.
c. That the floor cleaning machine left the wet
spot that Chaffin slipped in.

5.
The collective wisdom of a jury is great enough to
determine and make a factual finding of whether or not there is a
reasonable inference this water came from the floor cleaning
machine or was left by a phantom shopper.
6. Summary judgement was inappropriate in this case and this
should be remanded to the District Court for trial.
X.
ARGUMENT
CONTRADICTORY FACTS AS ALLEGED BY THE PARTIES ARE APPROPRIATE
TO BE PRESENTED TO A JURY.
By the facts of this case there is no doubt the appellant did
slip in the subject Albertson's store.

Thus the questions to be

presented to the jury are "What was the substance on the floor the
appellant slipped in?" and "How did the substance arrive upon the
floor?"
Albertsons has alleged

that their

employees/agent

moisture on the floor before or after the fall.

saw no

Kurt Treasure,

Meat Department Manager of the Albertsons, stated in an affidavit
to the Court that he had inspected the floor ten to fifteen minutes
before Chaffin fell and did not observe any water or any other
foreign

debris on the floor at that time.

Record

at

94-96.

Appellant does not dispute this statement. However, the Court must

5

keep in mind that the basis of the appellant's argument was that
the water was laid down by the floor cleaning machine almost
immediately before the fall.

Thus his statement further gives

credibility to the inference that the water was deposited by the
machine approximately 15 minutes after Treasure's viewing the area.
Record at 318-19 and 365.
Certainly

in

presenting

credibility must come up.

this

to

a

jury

the

issue

of

As in any case presented to a jury the

credibility of the witness must be weighed and accounted for by
the jury.

In this matter the appellant is making a claim that she

slipped in soapy water immediately after seeing the floor cleaning
machine. Record at 381-383. The appellee's employees/agents have
submitted affidavits alleging no substances were on the floor
before or after the fall which certainly must be looked at with
some suspicion.

And the testimony of the third-party defendant,

Alan Morley, also a favorable witness for the appellee's case,
should be looked at with some suspicion as Albertson's has filed
a third party claim against him for indemnification should a
favorable verdict be rendered for Chaffin.

Record 24-4 0.

A jury should be allowed to make their own factual conclusion
based upon common sense facts raised by the appellant when such
facts and circumstances are looked at most favorably for her by
this court.
Appellees state that Morley cleaned the outside aisles of the
store in the rear of the store one to one and a half hours before
the slip and fall.

However, in looking at Morley's map of the
6

accident scene it clearly shows his machine was making a turn
entering

the

back

aisle

thereby

placing

him

and

the

machine

directly over the area where Chaffin slipped just seconds later.
Record

at

315.

approximately

And

7:00

Morley

with

stated

the

he

accident

cleaned

that

occurring

area

at

immediately

thereafter and he turned around and saw her on the floor where he
had just cleaned.

Record at 318-19 and 321-22.

The incident

report submitted by Chaffin states the accident occurred at 7:05.
Record

at

102.

understand

the

As a matter
idea

that

the

of common
floor

sense

cleaning

the
made

jury
a

could

sweeping

circular turn to go from aisle to aisle and it was at that time
that the soapy water was deposited by the machine.
Chaffin, by placing the machine in the immediate area at the
spot immediately before she fall, has raised an inference that the
machine left the soapy water.
Again the collective knowledge of a jury would be able to
ferret out the facts and render a decision in this matter.
Chaff in has not stated it was just a wet substance she slipped
in, but has affirmatively testified it was a sudsy spot.
at 383.

Record

The machine did use soapy water to clean the floors.

Record at 309.

Again it is for a jury to decide if it was soapy

water laid down by the machine which left the spot or whether is
was "a customer spilling water, soda pop, another product, or even
moisture coming from the shoe of a customer.11

Appellee's brief at

26.
Here we have a retail grocery store getting ready for a busy
7

day with a few customers and eight to fifteen employees roaming the
store.

Record at 34 6.

The accident occurred in the back of the

store far from the entrance on a relatively pleasant dry winter
day.

Record at 373-74.
It is not conjecture or speculation for a jury to deduce;
1. The machine left the soapy water, or
2a. A phantom shopper tracked in the water on their shoes all

the way to the back of the store, stood in one spot and left the
wet spot, or
2b.

A shopper accidently spilled water, soda or some other

product in the exact spot the machine had just passed over in which
the appellant slipped.
If

the

floor

cleaning

machine

was

working

properly

as

Albertsons alleges, the machine should have cleaned up any foreign
substance on the floor as it passed over that spot.

There is no

testimony in the record that another shopper intervened

in the

seconds after the machine went over the spot and the time when
Chaffin slipped.

Thus, the only source of foreign substance on the

floor would be the machine and it would be contrary to Albertsons
argument to state that the machine worked properly and then in the
next breath state that it was a foreign substance on the floor
which their machine did not clean up that Chaffin slipped in.
Chaffin believes that appellees reliance on Koer vs Mayfair
Markets, 431 P2d 566 (Utah 1967) is inapplicable.

Koer involved

a patron slipping on a grape on an aisle that other shoppers were
using and that such accident occurred in the meat department, over
8

eighty-eight feet away from the produce department.

In Koer the

Court agreed that just because a grape was on the floor where a
store

manager

had

walked

minutes

before

that

there

was

no

presumption of constructive notice of the danger and therefore
there was no negligence by Mayfair Market.
notice

is

necessary

dangerous condition.

in

this

case

Chaffin argues that no

as Albertsons

created

the

Notice to Albertsons of the condition is not

relevant if it is determined by the fact finder that their machine
left the soapy water on the floor.
Appellees also rely on Lindsey vs. Eccles Hotel Company, 284
P2d 477

(Utah 1955).

In quoting Eccles the appellees believe

Chaffin fails to satisfy her burden as to how the water got onto
the floor, by whom it was deposited, exactly when it arrived there
or that Albertsons had knowledge of its presence.
Based upon the facts presented, a jury could easily find the
soapy

water

was

deposited

by

the

floor

cleaning

machine

at

approximately 7:00 a.m. and Albertson's knowledge of such event is
irrelevant as they controlled the machine and the situation in
which the water was deposited.
This case is more closely aligned with Campbell vs. Safeway
Store, 388 P2d 409 (Utah 1964) and with Silcox vs Skaggs Alpha
Beta, 814 P2d 623 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

Both these cases give

guidance to the ultimate question for the jury; "Is the probability
greater than not that the substance on the floor of the Albertsons
store in which appellant slipped was left by the floor cleaning
machine or by an unknown phantom shopper?"
9

This case is very far removed from the appellee's cited case,
Burns vs Cannondale Bicycle Company, 239 Utah Adv. Rep 57 (Utah Ct.
App. 1994) a case decided by this court in May of 1994.

In that

case the plaintiff/appellant stated he purchased a bicycle and he
had returned it for repairs.

After receiving the bike back Burns

was injured and suit was filed. The Court rejected the appellant's
argument stating that just because an accident occurred negligence
was not presumed.

Further "the accident could have resulted from

Burns own overly exuberant manipulation of the brakes; a hazard in
the road; or even the post-sale tampering with, or entry of some
foreign object into the brake mechanism.11

Burns at 57.

In Burns the court cited as dicta from a Montana case,
Brothers vs General Motors Corp, 658 P2d 1108, 1110, (Montana
1983) , that if a plaintiff rests on circumstantial evidence the
plaintiff must eliminate alternative causes of an accident.

This

seems somewhat in contradiction with Wyatt vs. Baughman, 239 P2d
193,

198

(Utah 1951) raised

in the appellant's first brief.

However, with her presentation of an inference of negligence
Chaffin believes that she has eliminated other events and sources
that may have caused the spot of water on the floor in conjunction
with the fact that the machine passed over the area immediately
prior to her falling.

This includes her testimony that the water

she slipped in was e japy and the fact that the machine used soapy
water.

In eliminating other causes, Chaffin did not vary in her

testimony that it w**s any other substance and the fact that the
store was relatively uncrowded and an early time of day in the far
10

back part of the store with a properly functioning machine gives
a set of facts that would allow a jury to eliminate all causes
except for the machine as the source of the water•
The appellant has raised an inference of negligence based upon
the known facts when viewed in a light most favorable to her. This
case should be allowed to be presented to a jury as

,f

. . . . the

question there is a factual one unless there is uncontradicted,
positive, and

competent

evidence one way

or

the

other that

negligence did [or did not] exist which would enable the court to
direct a verdict." Wyatt, 196-97. (Emphasis by court.)
XI.
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF
The appellant has met her burden for a factual question to be
presented to a jury by stating the facts that the machine passed
over the spot prior to her stepping in that spot and this machine
used soapy water and she slipped in soapy water. There appears to
be no evidence that there was any other type of substance on the
floor

that

Albertsons.

another

party

deposited

except

by

the

agent of

Thus this Court must look at the ultimate question

that the appellant would frame for a jury in this matter which is:
From the facts and inferences that can be drawn from these
facts, is there are greater probability that the floor
cleaning machine left a puddle of soapy water or that a
phantom shopper left an unknown substance on the floor in
which the appellant slipped?
Based upon this one question and the facts presented by the
parties, Summary Judgement in this matter was inappropriate and
11

this matter should be remanded back to the District Court for
trial.
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